Instrument rating check ride
December 12, 2017
The morning started at 5 am with another briefing of the weather for the day and updating the flight plan I had been assigned: KBMQ to KHOU using an arrival. It was a purely VFR day in all of Texas with the lowest freezing level at 12,000’, and the only detractor weather-wise was 30-kt winds at altitude and a Tango airmet for moderate turbulence below 8,000’. I printed a few charts, printed the weight and balance for our flight (as well as my flight over there, just in case), and got everything organized.
My checkride started with a one-hour flight into the wind from the flight school at KAUS over to KMBQ. The transition from surface to about 3000’ was pretty bumpy with pleasant smooth air on top. My weather briefing had shown stronger and gusty winds during mid-day, so I was a touch anxious about trying to nail headings and altitudes on approaches while getting bounced around, but it was what it was and I would do my best. I did the GPS 01 approach for giggles and landing at KBMQ was uneventful.
I’m a small person and parking the airplane is sometimes problematic for me. I can push it easily, but I’m not heavy enough to depress the tail far enough to get the nose up and redirect the plane during pushback, so it’s a complicated back and forth and trying to press a rudder pedal to steer with one foot while pushing with the other on the ground. Hilarious to bystanders, I’m sure. After a few tries I went into the KBMQ blue FBO building, introduced myself to the DPE, and asked for help to get within reach of the tie-downs! His first impression was probably either “this applicant can’t even park?” or “this applicant asks for help when needed.”
Inside, we made small talk for a few minutes while getting a cup of coffee and getting organized. The DPE is a friendly guy and is easy to be around, and that was a blessing to my nerves. He got his paperwork in order and I presented the required documents: photo ID, pilot’s certificate, medical certificate, logbook, aircraft registration and airworthiness certificate, and maintenance logs. Once it was proven and recorded that both the plane and I were airworthy, we got to the oral exam.
He started by emphasizing that the role of the examiner is to be a fair judge of knowledge and ability. He sincerely wants applicants to do well. The FAA is not looking for perfection, and he has discretion to let some mistakes and minor deficiencies slide so long as overall safety and competence are demonstrated. Gaping knowledge holes would be a reason to disapprove (which means stop the exam, get more training, then come back and try again within 60 days). During the practical flight, any intervention from the examiner for safety or timely response to ATC communications or instructions would be a reason to disapprove. A discontinuance, on the other hand, is when applicant or examiner proactively decides to end the exam because of sickness or weather that causes discomfort or other justification.
To begin the exam portion, he asked for the flight plan I had prepared for the hypothetical flight to KHOU and asked open-endedly about all of the preflighting and planning that went into it. I talked about the time of year and the concerns of winter flying, checking different weather charts and products, drilling down into forecasts for departure, destination and fields along the way should we need them. I talked about why I chose the BLUBELL3 arrival, the CWK ILEXY transition, 7000’ en route altitude (as well as mentioning the MEAs and OROCAs), what I might expect from ATC (like letting us skip CLL), what I would anticipate happening when we got to the Houston Class B airspace, which runway we’d expect to land on with which procedure (local winds, airplane equipment, fitting in with airlines and large traffic, etc). Overall he seemed satisfied with the preparation.
Since I had mentioned turbluence and winds in the day’s forecast, he asked about how passengers would play into the flight and decisions. We discussed being a good steward for aviation by involving passengers in the go/no-go decision, briefing them and checking on them during the flight, and also about managing distractions and changing plans in-flight with uncomfortable passengers.
Next we talked about how the flight would be different if instead of a beautiful VFR day we had solid IMC with low ceilings the whole way. I talked about personal minimums and evaluating whether the flight could be made safely and whether delaying or rescheduling would be a good idea. I talked about other weather products I would have at hand and knowing how to get to VFR if there was any reasonably nearby. I talked about higher demands at the destination as well as the need for an alternate and what it would have to provide. He asked a few regulatory questions about approaches and minimums for an alternate to check knowledge.
Next he introduced a comm failure into the hypothetical flight and asked me to evaluate. ATC had cleared the flight as filed and we were just past ILEXY on the arrival in IMC, no VFR nearby, and we had already done all the trouble-shooting to ensure comms were truly down. I squawked 7600 and talked through the process for selecting route and altitude in this case and what ATC would be expecting, and how our choices would either promote or compromise safety in the system. In talking out loud and looking at options using ForeFlight, I got stuck at the transition from the last arrival waypoint to the airport, a distance of over 40 nm that would ordinarily be directed by vectors through Class B to an approach. I was fumbling around with a plan to go direct to an IAF at an expected time as the process dictates but voicing my concerns about how all that other traffic was getting hosed by our situation and that it didn’t feel safe. This was the point where he asked what you should do if the safety of a flight is in question. That shifted my mindset to emergency decision-making, so I started backing up along the arrival to see where it might make sense to divert. Given that we were at ILEXY, there were several nearby airports, and we conferred together that the best choice would be KCLL, which was just ahead and immediately adjacent to a point on the arrival AND has IAPs AND has services.
After that he asked me to pull up a few IAPs and asked some questions about them, to assess my ability to read and interpret the plates. All fine. We talked about proficiency v. currency and staying sharp.
The oral was actually over more quickly than I thought it would be! It was about 2.5 hours from small talk to the end of the oral exam. At that point, we took a bathroom break and then discussed plans for the flight portion of the test. He explained what he’d be looking for and we talked about which approaches and maneuvers needed to be done. He assigned three approaches (KILE VOR-A missed with hold, KILE GPS, KBMQ GPS) for me to brief, but after I stated the GPS in N652MA was non-WAAS he changed the plan to include a non-GPS precision approach, the closest of which was the ILS at KTPL. The new plan was KTPL ILS missed with hold, KILE VOR-A, KBMQ GPS. With no tower or GCO/RCO near Burnet, he asked me how I could pick up the clearance; I told him either in the air VFR or by calling flight service.
It was 11:30 by this point, so he grabbed a sandwich and I ate the lunch I had packed while planning, briefing and filing. As I briefed, I found that the TPL VOR was out of service as of 9am, which meant the missed couldn’t be done as published, and that an FDC NOTAM had gone up during the oral exam describing an alternate missed procedure. I called Flight Service for a quick confirmation about the NOTAMs and asked about any other hazards or issues that might affect the flight; the guy was helpful and I don’t think it hurt that as I was talking to him on speakerphone, the DPE came back into the office and overheard that I was thoroughly doing my homework. The NOTAM’d hold put us quite close to an IAF for the GPS 33 at KTPL, so I took the plan to him of doing the KTPL ILS, missed with hold and then the KTPL GPS 33. He liked that idea and said to plan and file for those, followed by cancelling IFR on the way back toward KBMQ to do unusual attitudes, and then he’d give mock ATC instructions for executing the KBMQ GPS 19 with circling to land 01. Also he instructed that most of it would be under the foggles and that unless he told me to take off the foggles, to treat it as though we were still in IMC and make decisions appropriately.
The surface winds at KTPL were predicted to be 13G22, which is just beyond my personal limits, but they were aligned with the 15/33 runway and we weren’t actually planning to land so I just made a mental note to anticipate control challenges during the low approach and missed procedure. I made a plan for which points to load in the flight plan and the GPS, when I’d need to switch to different nav sources, filed for 12:30, and preflighted. There were a few minor delays, with his afternoon checkride applicant showing up really early and me needing to add oil (I had noted it was just at 6 in the cold at KAUS so brought a quart just in case; checking during this preflight showed 5.5). After the runup, I configured all of the avionics and radios, and he liked that rather than plugging in our filed flight first thing, I configured for an immediate-return-to-field scenario should there be trouble on departure.
We were off by 12:40 and it was so so bumpy climbing up. The DPE gave mock ATC instructions to get us headed the right direction while I was trimming and stabilizing, then I called Houston Center to get our clearance; done. They eventually handed us to Gray approach who vectored us over to the ILS 15. I tuned the localzier on nav1 and the ACT VORTAC (for the missed procedure) on nav1 and identified both. The mag compass had been pretty unstable, varying 20 degrees at times in straight and level flight in smooth air. Upon syncing the heading indicator for what seemed like the 20th time in 30 minutes, I told Gray we weren’t confident of the heading and asked if we needed to adjust; I was feeling a little flustered about the mag compass and fearing the ACS tolerance of +/- 10 degrees on heading! Gray was not too picky and super helpful (probably used to the DPE’s constant flow of applicants doing these things!), and in the debriefing after the flight he said I demonstrated good use of ATC as a resource, with this being one example. I tuned the AWOS, noted the winds, and made a comment about in the real situation we’d either use the ILS 15 to circle or the straight-in GPS 33 since the winds favored 33.
Someone else was doing the practice ILS also so he vectored us out for a pretty long approach. The DPE asked me about my descent from our current altitude and how I planned to manage the descent. I consulted the plate for glideslope intercept altitude and replied that ATC would be lowering us to intercept from beneath the glideslope, and then I stated the printed glideslope angle, noted that we’d have a tailwind, estimated our groundspeed, and flipped to the table in the dTPP (ForeFlight Documents FTW!) to select a descent rate of ~600 fpm and would use the movement of the glideslope needle to adjust as necessary. Gray eventually turned us in, lowered us and cleared us for the approach. He gave instructions for climb out and I confirmed that we would be doing the NOTAM’d alternate missed procedure.
Despite the bouncing and wind changes on descent along the glide path, I kept the localizer needle within one dot and did NOT go below glideslope, though I did go almost two dots above it at one point. At DH he had not said to remove the foggles so I initiated the missed. On climbing out, ATC asked if we were with him, and it dawned on me that he had never instructed us to change to advisory frequency at the airport, which is a busy airport given that it has two runways, five approaches and no tower, especially on a VFR day. The DPE had said at the start that he would do all traffic spotting and clearing, but my stomach seized a little when I realized we hadn’t been listening to local traffic calls for VFR planes. Once we were established in the climb and I had briefed the holding procedure and entry and made the plan for the following approach, I noted that we had not been instructed to change frequency and that you never change frequency without instruction. He agreed that we were in a dangerous situation given that particular airport (and my heart sank because that sounded disapproval-worthy), but that in actual IMC we would have been the only plane in the airspace and the wise pilot would be monitoring the local frequency on comm2. That was a light-bulb moment, and I admit that I had been so busy with the workload of aviating and navigating on approach, I didn’t have the mental cycles to consider that aspect of the communicating.
The NOTAM’d missed had a straight ahead climb to intercept the 181 radial from ACT and hold at CONRA/40 DME. I forwarded in the flight plan in the GPS to go direct CONRA in OBS mode and nav 2 was already tuned to ACT (nav1 was on the ILS). On the 181, ATC instructed to make left turns with 10 mile legs (what a relief! That would build in time to comfortably brief the GPS 33 approach again without fiddling with the clock and figuring out 1-minute inbound!), EFC and time now, let him know if we wanted to start the approach before then. When we reached CONRA, I made a standard-rate turn to the left, confirmed the GPS was giving DME to CONRA, already had the inbound radial dialed into OBS2, and set us up to track a reciprocal heading outbound. Almost immediately upon leveling, he said to tell Gray whenever I was ready for the approach, no need to complete a circuit in the hold. It took until about 9 DME to finish briefing and getting the GPS cycled to the next waypoint in the flight plan (FBURG, the IAF I had chosen for the approach), remembering to resume leg mode.
I called Gray, he asked how I wanted to do the approach and intentions after (FBURG, low approach, back to KBMQ). He asked if I wanted to get to FBURG by a right or left turn since I was headed the opposite direction on the outbound hold leg (a standard right-hand hold would have put us close to FBURG). I responded that I preferred right (would give a little more time between events) but could do whichever worked best for his traffic management. Right turns and vectors toward FBURG followed. After a few minutes he came back and cleared us to cross something that sounded like it started with an R at 4000 and that we were cleared for the approach. I asked for clarification, stating that we expected FBURG and could he spell the fix. He said it was FBURG so I just looked a little silly, but after getting set up the DPE said he also heard something that started with R, so good that I had clarified. After turning inbound on the final approach course, Gray approved the frequency change so I switched and announced positions; we were coordinating with another plane and a helicopter at this point.
On this approach, I made sure to get down early to the step-down altitudes and level off 100’ high, then use the remainder of the distance to the next fix to plan the next segment and descend the last 100’ close to the fix. After eventually getting through the segments and down to the MDA, he stated that we were still solidly in IMC and would not be able to land. I acknowledged and recited the missed approach instructions that we would be using after crossing the MAP at the runway threshold; I had the feeling that he was checking to see that I would in fact fly to the MAP before going missed.
After passing the threshold (judging by DME to the RW33 waypoint on the GPS) I initiated the climb over the runway, began the turn to the assigned heading of 240, announced to the Temple traffic what we were doing and switched back to Gray approach. After a short time the controller handed me off to the western Gray controller (120.07), but being bounced around and trying to aviate and navigate again, I mis-dialed 127.70 into the radio. No response. I switched back to the previous Gray frequency and asked for the frequency again. This time I dialed in 127.07 and again got no response. A quick glance at the GPS plate I had just executed showed the Gray control as 120.07 and I felt like an idiot. Proof of workload dragging down the details. Proper frequency dialed in, and this time got a response. The DPE had instructed me to cancel IFR but stay with them for flight following back to KBMQ since we’d be doing unusual attitudes and needed the freedom, so that’s what I did and thanked the controller for his help.
At this point we had a bit of time before getting into the Burnet area, so he let me take the foggles off and just look around. There was a fire burning to the northeast and based on the abrupt flat top to the smoke we talked about a temperature inversion, which is also associated with some of the lower turbulence I had been fighting.
Soon enough the foggles went back on and I closed my eyes with my head down while he took the airplane into an unusual attitude. The first was an extreme climbing turn, and when I looked up the first thing I saw was airspeed dropping below 60 kts, so I put the throttle to the max and lowered the nose, then leveled out and started back to the original altitude and heading. He took the controls again and this time it was an extreme diving turn. I could hear the engine roaring and when I looked up instantly snapped my eyes to the airspeed, which was near the top of the yellow arc (!!!!), so I pulled out the throttle, leveled the wings and pulled up, which was fighting me and that’s when I realized the trim had been set way nose low so I spun that wheel. My heart was definitely thumping after those two.
Next he gave me vectors to JIBAJ, the IAF we’d use for the circling GPS 19 approach back to KBMQ. I briefed it, listened to the ASOS, and got the GPS set up. I talked through the step downs and was set up on the approach course. I don’t remember what we talked about, but some conversation distracted me briefly and when I resumed focus on the approach, I mistook where we were, thinking we had already passed DLORA (IF) when in fact we were not yet to it. After DLORA the altitude goes from 3500 to 2600, so I started down and was repeating my next steps for the FAF ahead. He let me descend a few hundred feet before asking me where we were (“hint, hint, you’re screwing up”), and immediately I looked at the GPS, realized we weren’t to DLORA yet, so put in full power and pitched up and said “My kids!”, flashing to a real-life consequence of going below altitude with my family in the plane. We were back at 3500 in the blink of an eye, but he made a comment that it was a shame that the checkride had gone so well up until now. I was convinced that as of that moment I had failed; the examiner had to intervene for safety of flight. Regardless, I had to suck it up and complete the approach.
The rest of the approach went as planned, down to circling altitude of 2000’, at which time he told me to take off the foggles. There was 19 perfectly in front of us, and I announced that we’d shift right to enter a left downwind for 01. I kept it in tight, knowing that for circling we had to maintain visual reference to the runway. Abeam the numbers (19), he looked out his window and commented about how close that hill with towers was. I glanced and acknowledged; I was more focused on compensating for the strong wind trying to blow us over the runway and planning for that with my circle-to-land. At the far end we circled and were lined up well on the runway, but high. We wouldn’t need all of the 5000’ runway, so I said I was going to bring us down and try but would go around if it didn’t feel right, which ended up being the case. As I cleaned, crammed and climbed, he said to do a right pattern for 01 this time. Then it dawned on me: there’s an ODP for 01 about obstacles to the left of the departure end (the hill and towers) and 01 has right traffic. Bad, bad, bad planning! He instructed me to treat it like a circle-to-land and this one went better. We still landed long, but it was one of my better landings and we were able to make the earlier turnout so at least it ended well.
After taxiing to the tie-down spot, he was very brief in saying to do whatever shutdown I needed to do and meet him inside. As soon as the passenger door closed, I withered. It was a really good checkride until the last five minutes when I had two big mistakes! I was positive I had earned a disapproval and was dreading the debrief.
Inside, we talked. He applauded the interactions with ATC, the planning and the abilities in the aircraft. We went over a few points and finally got to the last approach. Regarding the loss of situational awareness, he was not going to withhold approval since I did not descend not below the MDA, I aggressively corrected the error, and it was a good learning experience. Regarding the poor choice of circling paths, he was not going to withhold approval since I kept in so tight to the runway and stuck to the MDA; it was safe but also a good learning experience that the circling plan should maximize the safety margin by utilizing airport and obstacle information. He reiterated that at this point the FAA is not expecting perfection, and that overall I demonstrated good aviating and decision-making skills that would make me a safe pilot in IMC.
And with that, I became an instrument-rated pilot! It was a happy flight home to KAUS.
December 12, 2017
The morning started at 5 am with another briefing of the weather for the day and updating the flight plan I had been assigned: KBMQ to KHOU using an arrival. It was a purely VFR day in all of Texas with the lowest freezing level at 12,000’, and the only detractor weather-wise was 30-kt winds at altitude and a Tango airmet for moderate turbulence below 8,000’. I printed a few charts, printed the weight and balance for our flight (as well as my flight over there, just in case), and got everything organized.
My checkride started with a one-hour flight into the wind from the flight school at KAUS over to KMBQ. The transition from surface to about 3000’ was pretty bumpy with pleasant smooth air on top. My weather briefing had shown stronger and gusty winds during mid-day, so I was a touch anxious about trying to nail headings and altitudes on approaches while getting bounced around, but it was what it was and I would do my best. I did the GPS 01 approach for giggles and landing at KBMQ was uneventful.
I’m a small person and parking the airplane is sometimes problematic for me. I can push it easily, but I’m not heavy enough to depress the tail far enough to get the nose up and redirect the plane during pushback, so it’s a complicated back and forth and trying to press a rudder pedal to steer with one foot while pushing with the other on the ground. Hilarious to bystanders, I’m sure. After a few tries I went into the KBMQ blue FBO building, introduced myself to the DPE, and asked for help to get within reach of the tie-downs! His first impression was probably either “this applicant can’t even park?” or “this applicant asks for help when needed.”
Inside, we made small talk for a few minutes while getting a cup of coffee and getting organized. The DPE is a friendly guy and is easy to be around, and that was a blessing to my nerves. He got his paperwork in order and I presented the required documents: photo ID, pilot’s certificate, medical certificate, logbook, aircraft registration and airworthiness certificate, and maintenance logs. Once it was proven and recorded that both the plane and I were airworthy, we got to the oral exam.
He started by emphasizing that the role of the examiner is to be a fair judge of knowledge and ability. He sincerely wants applicants to do well. The FAA is not looking for perfection, and he has discretion to let some mistakes and minor deficiencies slide so long as overall safety and competence are demonstrated. Gaping knowledge holes would be a reason to disapprove (which means stop the exam, get more training, then come back and try again within 60 days). During the practical flight, any intervention from the examiner for safety or timely response to ATC communications or instructions would be a reason to disapprove. A discontinuance, on the other hand, is when applicant or examiner proactively decides to end the exam because of sickness or weather that causes discomfort or other justification.
To begin the exam portion, he asked for the flight plan I had prepared for the hypothetical flight to KHOU and asked open-endedly about all of the preflighting and planning that went into it. I talked about the time of year and the concerns of winter flying, checking different weather charts and products, drilling down into forecasts for departure, destination and fields along the way should we need them. I talked about why I chose the BLUBELL3 arrival, the CWK ILEXY transition, 7000’ en route altitude (as well as mentioning the MEAs and OROCAs), what I might expect from ATC (like letting us skip CLL), what I would anticipate happening when we got to the Houston Class B airspace, which runway we’d expect to land on with which procedure (local winds, airplane equipment, fitting in with airlines and large traffic, etc). Overall he seemed satisfied with the preparation.
Since I had mentioned turbluence and winds in the day’s forecast, he asked about how passengers would play into the flight and decisions. We discussed being a good steward for aviation by involving passengers in the go/no-go decision, briefing them and checking on them during the flight, and also about managing distractions and changing plans in-flight with uncomfortable passengers.
Next we talked about how the flight would be different if instead of a beautiful VFR day we had solid IMC with low ceilings the whole way. I talked about personal minimums and evaluating whether the flight could be made safely and whether delaying or rescheduling would be a good idea. I talked about other weather products I would have at hand and knowing how to get to VFR if there was any reasonably nearby. I talked about higher demands at the destination as well as the need for an alternate and what it would have to provide. He asked a few regulatory questions about approaches and minimums for an alternate to check knowledge.
Next he introduced a comm failure into the hypothetical flight and asked me to evaluate. ATC had cleared the flight as filed and we were just past ILEXY on the arrival in IMC, no VFR nearby, and we had already done all the trouble-shooting to ensure comms were truly down. I squawked 7600 and talked through the process for selecting route and altitude in this case and what ATC would be expecting, and how our choices would either promote or compromise safety in the system. In talking out loud and looking at options using ForeFlight, I got stuck at the transition from the last arrival waypoint to the airport, a distance of over 40 nm that would ordinarily be directed by vectors through Class B to an approach. I was fumbling around with a plan to go direct to an IAF at an expected time as the process dictates but voicing my concerns about how all that other traffic was getting hosed by our situation and that it didn’t feel safe. This was the point where he asked what you should do if the safety of a flight is in question. That shifted my mindset to emergency decision-making, so I started backing up along the arrival to see where it might make sense to divert. Given that we were at ILEXY, there were several nearby airports, and we conferred together that the best choice would be KCLL, which was just ahead and immediately adjacent to a point on the arrival AND has IAPs AND has services.
After that he asked me to pull up a few IAPs and asked some questions about them, to assess my ability to read and interpret the plates. All fine. We talked about proficiency v. currency and staying sharp.
The oral was actually over more quickly than I thought it would be! It was about 2.5 hours from small talk to the end of the oral exam. At that point, we took a bathroom break and then discussed plans for the flight portion of the test. He explained what he’d be looking for and we talked about which approaches and maneuvers needed to be done. He assigned three approaches (KILE VOR-A missed with hold, KILE GPS, KBMQ GPS) for me to brief, but after I stated the GPS in N652MA was non-WAAS he changed the plan to include a non-GPS precision approach, the closest of which was the ILS at KTPL. The new plan was KTPL ILS missed with hold, KILE VOR-A, KBMQ GPS. With no tower or GCO/RCO near Burnet, he asked me how I could pick up the clearance; I told him either in the air VFR or by calling flight service.
It was 11:30 by this point, so he grabbed a sandwich and I ate the lunch I had packed while planning, briefing and filing. As I briefed, I found that the TPL VOR was out of service as of 9am, which meant the missed couldn’t be done as published, and that an FDC NOTAM had gone up during the oral exam describing an alternate missed procedure. I called Flight Service for a quick confirmation about the NOTAMs and asked about any other hazards or issues that might affect the flight; the guy was helpful and I don’t think it hurt that as I was talking to him on speakerphone, the DPE came back into the office and overheard that I was thoroughly doing my homework. The NOTAM’d hold put us quite close to an IAF for the GPS 33 at KTPL, so I took the plan to him of doing the KTPL ILS, missed with hold and then the KTPL GPS 33. He liked that idea and said to plan and file for those, followed by cancelling IFR on the way back toward KBMQ to do unusual attitudes, and then he’d give mock ATC instructions for executing the KBMQ GPS 19 with circling to land 01. Also he instructed that most of it would be under the foggles and that unless he told me to take off the foggles, to treat it as though we were still in IMC and make decisions appropriately.
The surface winds at KTPL were predicted to be 13G22, which is just beyond my personal limits, but they were aligned with the 15/33 runway and we weren’t actually planning to land so I just made a mental note to anticipate control challenges during the low approach and missed procedure. I made a plan for which points to load in the flight plan and the GPS, when I’d need to switch to different nav sources, filed for 12:30, and preflighted. There were a few minor delays, with his afternoon checkride applicant showing up really early and me needing to add oil (I had noted it was just at 6 in the cold at KAUS so brought a quart just in case; checking during this preflight showed 5.5). After the runup, I configured all of the avionics and radios, and he liked that rather than plugging in our filed flight first thing, I configured for an immediate-return-to-field scenario should there be trouble on departure.
We were off by 12:40 and it was so so bumpy climbing up. The DPE gave mock ATC instructions to get us headed the right direction while I was trimming and stabilizing, then I called Houston Center to get our clearance; done. They eventually handed us to Gray approach who vectored us over to the ILS 15. I tuned the localzier on nav1 and the ACT VORTAC (for the missed procedure) on nav1 and identified both. The mag compass had been pretty unstable, varying 20 degrees at times in straight and level flight in smooth air. Upon syncing the heading indicator for what seemed like the 20th time in 30 minutes, I told Gray we weren’t confident of the heading and asked if we needed to adjust; I was feeling a little flustered about the mag compass and fearing the ACS tolerance of +/- 10 degrees on heading! Gray was not too picky and super helpful (probably used to the DPE’s constant flow of applicants doing these things!), and in the debriefing after the flight he said I demonstrated good use of ATC as a resource, with this being one example. I tuned the AWOS, noted the winds, and made a comment about in the real situation we’d either use the ILS 15 to circle or the straight-in GPS 33 since the winds favored 33.
Someone else was doing the practice ILS also so he vectored us out for a pretty long approach. The DPE asked me about my descent from our current altitude and how I planned to manage the descent. I consulted the plate for glideslope intercept altitude and replied that ATC would be lowering us to intercept from beneath the glideslope, and then I stated the printed glideslope angle, noted that we’d have a tailwind, estimated our groundspeed, and flipped to the table in the dTPP (ForeFlight Documents FTW!) to select a descent rate of ~600 fpm and would use the movement of the glideslope needle to adjust as necessary. Gray eventually turned us in, lowered us and cleared us for the approach. He gave instructions for climb out and I confirmed that we would be doing the NOTAM’d alternate missed procedure.
Despite the bouncing and wind changes on descent along the glide path, I kept the localizer needle within one dot and did NOT go below glideslope, though I did go almost two dots above it at one point. At DH he had not said to remove the foggles so I initiated the missed. On climbing out, ATC asked if we were with him, and it dawned on me that he had never instructed us to change to advisory frequency at the airport, which is a busy airport given that it has two runways, five approaches and no tower, especially on a VFR day. The DPE had said at the start that he would do all traffic spotting and clearing, but my stomach seized a little when I realized we hadn’t been listening to local traffic calls for VFR planes. Once we were established in the climb and I had briefed the holding procedure and entry and made the plan for the following approach, I noted that we had not been instructed to change frequency and that you never change frequency without instruction. He agreed that we were in a dangerous situation given that particular airport (and my heart sank because that sounded disapproval-worthy), but that in actual IMC we would have been the only plane in the airspace and the wise pilot would be monitoring the local frequency on comm2. That was a light-bulb moment, and I admit that I had been so busy with the workload of aviating and navigating on approach, I didn’t have the mental cycles to consider that aspect of the communicating.
The NOTAM’d missed had a straight ahead climb to intercept the 181 radial from ACT and hold at CONRA/40 DME. I forwarded in the flight plan in the GPS to go direct CONRA in OBS mode and nav 2 was already tuned to ACT (nav1 was on the ILS). On the 181, ATC instructed to make left turns with 10 mile legs (what a relief! That would build in time to comfortably brief the GPS 33 approach again without fiddling with the clock and figuring out 1-minute inbound!), EFC and time now, let him know if we wanted to start the approach before then. When we reached CONRA, I made a standard-rate turn to the left, confirmed the GPS was giving DME to CONRA, already had the inbound radial dialed into OBS2, and set us up to track a reciprocal heading outbound. Almost immediately upon leveling, he said to tell Gray whenever I was ready for the approach, no need to complete a circuit in the hold. It took until about 9 DME to finish briefing and getting the GPS cycled to the next waypoint in the flight plan (FBURG, the IAF I had chosen for the approach), remembering to resume leg mode.
I called Gray, he asked how I wanted to do the approach and intentions after (FBURG, low approach, back to KBMQ). He asked if I wanted to get to FBURG by a right or left turn since I was headed the opposite direction on the outbound hold leg (a standard right-hand hold would have put us close to FBURG). I responded that I preferred right (would give a little more time between events) but could do whichever worked best for his traffic management. Right turns and vectors toward FBURG followed. After a few minutes he came back and cleared us to cross something that sounded like it started with an R at 4000 and that we were cleared for the approach. I asked for clarification, stating that we expected FBURG and could he spell the fix. He said it was FBURG so I just looked a little silly, but after getting set up the DPE said he also heard something that started with R, so good that I had clarified. After turning inbound on the final approach course, Gray approved the frequency change so I switched and announced positions; we were coordinating with another plane and a helicopter at this point.
On this approach, I made sure to get down early to the step-down altitudes and level off 100’ high, then use the remainder of the distance to the next fix to plan the next segment and descend the last 100’ close to the fix. After eventually getting through the segments and down to the MDA, he stated that we were still solidly in IMC and would not be able to land. I acknowledged and recited the missed approach instructions that we would be using after crossing the MAP at the runway threshold; I had the feeling that he was checking to see that I would in fact fly to the MAP before going missed.
After passing the threshold (judging by DME to the RW33 waypoint on the GPS) I initiated the climb over the runway, began the turn to the assigned heading of 240, announced to the Temple traffic what we were doing and switched back to Gray approach. After a short time the controller handed me off to the western Gray controller (120.07), but being bounced around and trying to aviate and navigate again, I mis-dialed 127.70 into the radio. No response. I switched back to the previous Gray frequency and asked for the frequency again. This time I dialed in 127.07 and again got no response. A quick glance at the GPS plate I had just executed showed the Gray control as 120.07 and I felt like an idiot. Proof of workload dragging down the details. Proper frequency dialed in, and this time got a response. The DPE had instructed me to cancel IFR but stay with them for flight following back to KBMQ since we’d be doing unusual attitudes and needed the freedom, so that’s what I did and thanked the controller for his help.
At this point we had a bit of time before getting into the Burnet area, so he let me take the foggles off and just look around. There was a fire burning to the northeast and based on the abrupt flat top to the smoke we talked about a temperature inversion, which is also associated with some of the lower turbulence I had been fighting.
Soon enough the foggles went back on and I closed my eyes with my head down while he took the airplane into an unusual attitude. The first was an extreme climbing turn, and when I looked up the first thing I saw was airspeed dropping below 60 kts, so I put the throttle to the max and lowered the nose, then leveled out and started back to the original altitude and heading. He took the controls again and this time it was an extreme diving turn. I could hear the engine roaring and when I looked up instantly snapped my eyes to the airspeed, which was near the top of the yellow arc (!!!!), so I pulled out the throttle, leveled the wings and pulled up, which was fighting me and that’s when I realized the trim had been set way nose low so I spun that wheel. My heart was definitely thumping after those two.
Next he gave me vectors to JIBAJ, the IAF we’d use for the circling GPS 19 approach back to KBMQ. I briefed it, listened to the ASOS, and got the GPS set up. I talked through the step downs and was set up on the approach course. I don’t remember what we talked about, but some conversation distracted me briefly and when I resumed focus on the approach, I mistook where we were, thinking we had already passed DLORA (IF) when in fact we were not yet to it. After DLORA the altitude goes from 3500 to 2600, so I started down and was repeating my next steps for the FAF ahead. He let me descend a few hundred feet before asking me where we were (“hint, hint, you’re screwing up”), and immediately I looked at the GPS, realized we weren’t to DLORA yet, so put in full power and pitched up and said “My kids!”, flashing to a real-life consequence of going below altitude with my family in the plane. We were back at 3500 in the blink of an eye, but he made a comment that it was a shame that the checkride had gone so well up until now. I was convinced that as of that moment I had failed; the examiner had to intervene for safety of flight. Regardless, I had to suck it up and complete the approach.
The rest of the approach went as planned, down to circling altitude of 2000’, at which time he told me to take off the foggles. There was 19 perfectly in front of us, and I announced that we’d shift right to enter a left downwind for 01. I kept it in tight, knowing that for circling we had to maintain visual reference to the runway. Abeam the numbers (19), he looked out his window and commented about how close that hill with towers was. I glanced and acknowledged; I was more focused on compensating for the strong wind trying to blow us over the runway and planning for that with my circle-to-land. At the far end we circled and were lined up well on the runway, but high. We wouldn’t need all of the 5000’ runway, so I said I was going to bring us down and try but would go around if it didn’t feel right, which ended up being the case. As I cleaned, crammed and climbed, he said to do a right pattern for 01 this time. Then it dawned on me: there’s an ODP for 01 about obstacles to the left of the departure end (the hill and towers) and 01 has right traffic. Bad, bad, bad planning! He instructed me to treat it like a circle-to-land and this one went better. We still landed long, but it was one of my better landings and we were able to make the earlier turnout so at least it ended well.
After taxiing to the tie-down spot, he was very brief in saying to do whatever shutdown I needed to do and meet him inside. As soon as the passenger door closed, I withered. It was a really good checkride until the last five minutes when I had two big mistakes! I was positive I had earned a disapproval and was dreading the debrief.
And with that, I became an instrument-rated pilot! It was a happy flight home to KAUS.
